The Schlieffen Plan was the German General Staff's early 20th century overall strategic plan for victory in a possible future war where it might find itself fighting on two fronts: France France (pronounced /ˈfrænts/ frantss or /ˈfrɑːnts/ frahnts; French pronunciation (help·info): [fʁɑ̃s]), officially the French Republic (French: République française, pronounced: [ʁepyblik fʁɑ̃sɛz]), is a state in Western Europe with several of its overseas territories and islands located on other continents and in the Indian, to the west and Russia Russia (pronounced /ˈrʌʃə/ ; Russian: Россия, tr. Rossiya, pronounced [rɐˈsʲijə] ( listen)), also officially known as the Russian Federation (Russian: Российская Федерация, tr. Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, pronounced [rɐˈsʲijskəjə fʲɪdʲɪˈraʦəjə] ( listen)), is a country in northern Eurasia. It is a federal to the east. The First World War World War I was a military conflict that lasted from 1914 to 1918 and involved most of the world's great powers, assembled in two opposing alliances: the Allies and the Central Powers. More than 70 million military personnel, including 60 million Europeans, were mobilized in one of the largest wars in history. More than 15 million people were later became such a war with both a Western Front Following the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the German army opened the Western Front by first invading Luxembourg and Belgium, then gaining military control of important industrial regions in France. The tide of the advance was dramatically turned with the Battle of the Marne. Both sides then dug in along a meandering line of fortified trenches, and an Eastern Front The Eastern Front was a theatre of war during World War I in Central and, primarily, Eastern Europe. The term is in contrast to the Western Front. Despite the geographical separation, the events in the two theatres strongly influenced each other. In Russian sources, the war was sometimes called the Second Fatherland War. The plan took advantage of expected differences in the three countries' speed in preparing for war. In short, it was the German plan to avoid a two-front war by concentrating their troops in the west, quickly defeating the French and then, if necessary, rushing those troops by rail to the east to face the Russians before they had time to mobilize fully. The Schlieffen Plan was created by Count Alfred von Schlieffen Alfred Graf von Schlieffen mostly called Count Schlieffen was a German field marshal and strategist who served as Chief of the Imperial German General Staff from 1891 to 1906. His name lived on in the 1905 Schlieffen Plan for the defeat of the French Third Republic and the Russian Empire and modified by Helmuth von Moltke the Younger after Schlieffen's retirement. It was Moltke who actually put the plan into action, despite initial reservations about it.[citation needed] In modified form, it was executed to near victory in the first month of World War I World War I was a military conflict that lasted from 1914 to 1918 and involved most of the world's great powers, assembled in two opposing alliances: the Allies and the Central Powers. More than 70 million military personnel, including 60 million Europeans, were mobilized in one of the largest wars in history. More than 15 million people were; however, the modifications to the original plan, a French counterattack on the outskirts of Paris Paris ([paʁi] in French, pronounced /ˈpærɪs/ in English) is the capital and largest city of France. It is situated on the river Seine, in northern France, at the heart of the Île-de-France region (or Paris Region, French: Région parisienne). The city of Paris, within its administrative limits largely unchanged since 1860, has an estimated (the Battle of the Marne The Battle of the Marne was a First World War battle fought between the 5th and 12th of September 1914. It resulted in a Franco-British victory against the German Army under Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. The battle effectively ended the month-long German offensive that opened the war and reached the outskirts of Paris. The counter-), and surprisingly speedy Russian offensives, ended the German offensive and resulted in years of trench warfare Trench warfare is a form of warfare in which both combatants occupied fighting lines, consisting largely of trenches, in which troops were largely immune to the enemy's small arms fire and were substantially sheltered from artillery. It has become a byword for stalemate in conflict, with a slow wearing down of opposing forces. Trench warfare. The plan has been the subject of intense debate among historians and military scholars ever since. Schlieffen's last words were "remember to keep the right flank strong", a request which was watered down by Moltke.
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The Plan
After the Franco-Prussian War The Franco-Prussian War or Franco-German War, often referred to in France as the 1870 War was a conflict between the Second French Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. Prussia was aided by the North German Confederation, of which it was a member, and the South German states of Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria. The complete Prussian and German victory of 1870, the French province of Alsace-Lorraine Alsace-Lorraine was a territory created by the German Empire in 1871 after the annexation of most of Alsace and the Moselle region of Lorraine in the Franco-Prussian War. The Alsatian part lay in the Rhine Valley on the west bank of the Rhine River and east of the Vosges Mountains. The Lorraine section was in the upper Moselle valley to the north, with a mixed population of both French and Germans, had been made part of the German Empire The German Empire refers to Germany from the unification of Germany and proclamation of Wilhelm I as German Emperor on 18 January 1871 to 1918, when it became a federal republic after defeat in World War I and the abdication of Wilhelm II (28 November 1918). Deutsches Reich remained the official name of Germany throughout the Weimar period and. The revanchist French Third Republic The French Third Republic was the republican government of France between the end of the Second French Empire (following the defeat of Louis-Napoléon in the Franco-Prussian War) in 1870 and the Vichy Regime after the invasion of France by the German Third Reich in 1940 vowed to regain the territories France had possessed for nearly 200 years. Due to Bismarck Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck, was a Prussian/German statesman of the late 19th century, and a dominant figure in world affairs. As Ministerpräsident, or Prime Minister, of Prussia from 1862–1890, he oversaw the unification of Germany. In 1867 he became Chancellor of the North German Confederation. He designed the German Empire in 1871,'s alliances, France was initially isolated, but after Kaiser Wilhelm II Wilhelm II (27 January 1859 – 4 June 1941) was the last German Emperor and King of Prussia, ruling both the German Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia from 15 June 1888 to 9 November 1918. He was known either as The Kaiser or Kaiser Bill during World War I took the throne in 1888 and gradually estranged Germany from Russia The Russian Empire was a state that existed from 1721 until the Russian Revolution of 1917. It was the successor to the Tsardom of Russia, and the predecessor of the Soviet Union. It was the second largest contiguous empire in world history, surpassed only by the Mongol Empire, and the third largest empire behind the British Empire and the Mongol and Britain The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland[note 7] is a sovereign state located off the northwestern coast of continental Europe. It is an island country, spanning an archipelago including Great Britain, the northeastern part of the island of Ireland, and many small islands. Northern Ireland is the only part of the UK with a land, fears about having to fight a future war on two fronts simultaneously grew among German leaders.
France, having been beaten in a few weeks in 1870, was not considered as dangerous in the long run as the Russian Empire, which was expected to be hard to defeat if the Czar was allowed the necessary time to mobilize his huge country to the fullest extent. After the Entente Cordiale The Entente-cordiale is a series of agreements signed on 8 April 1904 between the United Kingdom and the French Republic. Beyond the immediate concerns of colonial expansion addressed by the agreement, the signing of the Entente cordiale marked the end of almost a millennium of intermittent conflict between the two nations and their predecessor of 1904 was signed between Britain and France, Kaiser Wilhelm asked Count Schlieffen to devise a plan which would allow Germany to fight a war on two fronts, and in December 1905 von Schlieffen began circulating it.
The idea of the plan was to win the two-front war by first quickly beating France again in the west – the plan scheduled 39 days for the fall of Paris Paris ([paʁi] in French, pronounced /ˈpærɪs/ in English) is the capital and largest city of France. It is situated on the river Seine, in northern France, at the heart of the Île-de-France region (or Paris Region, French: Région parisienne). The city of Paris, within its administrative limits largely unchanged since 1860, has an estimated and 42 for the capitulation of France – before the "Russian Steamroller" would be able to mobilize and descend upon East Prussia East Prussia (German: Ostpreußen, pronounced [ˈɔstˌpʁɔʏsən] ; Polish: Prusy Wschodnie; Lithuanian: Rytų Prūsija or Rytprūsiai; Russian: Восточная Пруссия or Vostochnaya Prussiya) is the main part of the region of Prussia along the southeastern Baltic Coast from the 13th century to the end of World War II in May 1945.[1] The plan depended on Germany's ability to quickly mobilize troops and invade France before France could fully mobilize its troops to defend itself, and then to turn on Russia, seen as the slowest of the three to mobilize, before the Russians were ready.
It envisaged a rapid German mobilization Mobilization is the act of assembling and making both troops and supplies ready for war. The word mobilization was first used, in a military context, in order to describe the preparation of the Prussian army during the 1850s and 1860s. Mobilization theories and techniques have continuously changed since then. Notably, before World War I and World, disregard of the neutrality A neutral power in a particular war is a sovereign state which declares itself to be neutral towards the belligerents. A non-belligerent state does not need to be neutral. The rights and duties of a neutral power are defined in Sections 5 and 13 of the Hague Convention of 1907. A permanently neutral power is a sovereign state which is bound by of Luxembourg Luxembourg (pronounced /ˈlʌksəmbɜrɡ/ LUKS-əm-berg), officially the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Luxembourgish: Groussherzogtum Lëtzebuerg, French: Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, German: Großherzogtum Luxemburg), is a landlocked country in western Europe, bordered by Belgium, France, and Germany. Luxembourg has a population of over half a, Belgium Belgium (pronounced /ˈbɛldʒəm/ , BEL-jəm), officially the Kingdom of Belgium, is a country in northwest Europe. It is a founding member of the European Union and hosts its headquarters, as well as those of other major international organizations, including NATO. Belgium covers an area of 30,528 square kilometres (11,787 sq mi), and it has a and the Netherlands The Netherlands (pronounced /ˈnɛðɚləndz/ ; Dutch: Nederland, pronounced [ˈneːdərlɑnt] ( listen)) is a constituent country of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, located in North-West Europe. It is a parliamentary democratic constitutional monarchy. The Netherlands borders the North Sea to the north and west, Belgium to the south, and Germany, and an overwhelming sweep of the powerful German right wing southwest through Belgium and Northern France, "letting the last man on the right, brush the Channel with his sleeve,"[2] in the words of Schlieffen, while maintaining only a defensive posture on the central and left wings, in Lorraine, the Vosges The Vosges are a range of low mountains in eastern France, near its border with Germany. They extend along the west side of the Rhine valley in a north-north-east direction, mainly from Belfort to Saverne, and the Moselle The Moselle is a river flowing through France, Luxembourg and Germany. It is a left tributary of the Rhine, joining it at Koblenz. A small part of Belgium is also drained by the Mosel through the Our.
Paris was not to be taken (in 1870, the Siege of Paris As early as August 1870 the Prussian 3rd Army led by the Crown Prince Frederick III had been marching towards Paris, but was recalled to deal with French forces accompanied by Napoleon III himself. These forces were crushed at the Battle of Sedan and the road to Paris was left open. Personally leading the Prussian forces Wilhelm I of Prussia along had lasted for months) but was to be passed by the right wing to the west of the city. The intent of the plan was not to conquer cities or industry in order to weaken the French war efforts, but to capture most of the French Army The French Army, officially the Armée de Terre , is the land-based component of the French Armed Forces and its largest. As of 2008, the army employs 133,947 regular soldiers . All soldiers are now considered professionals, following the suspension of conscription voted in parliament in 1997 and effective as of 2001. Just like the Armée de l'Air, and to force France to surrender, in essence a repeat of the strategy used to defeat France during the Franco-Prussian War The Franco-Prussian War or Franco-German War, often referred to in France as the 1870 War was a conflict between the Second French Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. Prussia was aided by the North German Confederation, of which it was a member, and the South German states of Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria. The complete Prussian and German victory. The plan was that the French Army would be hemmed in around Paris and forced to fight a decisive envelopment battle.
A seed of disaster lurked in the conception of the plan: both Schlieffen and the man who would eventually implement his plan, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, were seduced by the possibility of the double envelopment of the entire French Army by the right wing coming from the north and west of France and the left wing coming from the east. The inspiration was the destruction of the Roman Army Rome's military was always tightly keyed to its political system. In the Roman kingdom the social standing of a person impacted both his political and military roles. The political system was from an early date based upon competition within the ruling elite. Senators in the Republic competed fiercely for public office, the most coveted of which by Hannibal Hannibal, son of Hamilcar Barca[n 1] ,[n 2] commonly known as Hannibal (in Punic: ḤNBʻL Ḥannibaʻal or Ḥannibaʻl, meaning "Ba'al is/has been gracious" or "Grace of Baal" or perhaps Ḥannobaʻal, with the former meaning, or, finally, ʼDNBʻL ʼAdnibaʻal, meaning "Ba'al is my lord"; in Greek: Ἁννίβας,'s forces at the Battle of Cannae The Battle of Cannae was a major battle of the Second Punic War, taking place on August 2, 216 BC near the town of Cannae in Apulia in southeast Italy. The army of Carthage under Hannibal decisively defeated a numerically superior army of the Roman Republic under command of the consuls Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro. It is in 216 BC, which was the object of meticulous study by Schlieffen. In essence, his plan was a very large scale strategic readdressing of Hannibal Hannibal, son of Hamilcar Barca[n 1] ,[n 2] commonly known as Hannibal (in Punic: ḤNBʻL Ḥannibaʻal or Ḥannibaʻl, meaning "Ba'al is/has been gracious" or "Grace of Baal" or perhaps Ḥannobaʻal, with the former meaning, or, finally, ʼDNBʻL ʼAdnibaʻal, meaning "Ba'al is my lord"; in Greek: Ἁννίβας,'s tactics, capitalizing on the recent breakthroughs in communications and transport.
Politically, one of the major drawbacks of the Schlieffen Plan was that it called for the invasion of neutral states in order to pass through German troops to France. As it turned out, at least formally, it was the decision to invade Belgium which led to war with Great Britain.
As noted previously, Russian mobilization would supposedly be extremely slow, due to its poor railway system. Following the speedy defeat of France, the German General Staff would switch German concentrations to the Eastern Front The Eastern Front was a theatre of war during World War I in Central and, primarily, Eastern Europe. The term is in contrast to the Western Front. Despite the geographical separation, the events in the two theatres strongly influenced each other. In Russian sources, the war was sometimes called the Second Fatherland War. The plan called for sending 91% of the German troops to France and 9% to Russia. His goal was to defeat France in six weeks, the time it took for Russia to mobilize its army, and turn back to the Eastern Front before Russia could react. Kaiser Wilhelm II is quoted as having said "Paris for lunch, dinner at St. Petersburg."
Modifications to the Plan, 1906
Map of the Schlieffen Plan and planned French counter-offensivesFollowing the retirement of Schlieffen in 1906, Helmuth von Moltke became the German chief of staff. He disagreed with at least some of the Schlieffen Plan, thinking it to be too risky. The Plan, however, having been devised in 1905, was now too much a part of German military thinking to be abandoned completely, so all Moltke could do was modify it.
- Moltke decided to pull significant numbers of troops away from the main force entering France from the north, in order to fortify the forces in Alsace-Lorraine Alsace-Lorraine was a territory created by the German Empire in 1871 after the annexation of most of Alsace and the Moselle region of Lorraine in the Franco-Prussian War. The Alsatian part lay in the Rhine Valley on the west bank of the Rhine River and east of the Vosges Mountains. The Lorraine section was in the upper Moselle valley to the north, and the forces at the Russian border.
- The other significant change he made was not to enter through the Netherlands The Netherlands (pronounced /ˈnɛðɚləndz/ ; Dutch: Nederland, pronounced [ˈneːdərlɑnt] ( listen)) is a constituent country of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, located in North-West Europe. It is a parliamentary democratic constitutional monarchy. The Netherlands borders the North Sea to the north and west, Belgium to the south, and Germany, instead sending troops through Belgium and Luxembourg The German occupation of Luxembourg in World War I was the first of two military occupations of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg by Germany in the twentieth century. From August 1914 until the end of World War I in November 1918, Luxembourg was under full occupation by the German Empire. The German government justified the occupation by citing the only.
These changes have been the subject of much debate. L.C.F Turner in 1970 described von Moltke's changes as "a substantial modification in the Schlieffen Plan and one which probably doomed the German campaign in the west before it was ever launched." Turner claims that by weakening the main German offensive, they did not have a real chance of defeating the French army quickly enough; hence they became stranded in a two-front-war. He also says that not going through the Netherlands not only created a bottleneck at the German-Belgian border, but also that not having the Dutch railways at their disposal created a huge supply problem, a problem which outweighed the benefits they gained by still having access to the Dutch ports. However, in 1977 Martin van Creveld Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam, but has lived in Israel since shortly after his birth. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the author of seventeen books on military history and strategy, of which Command in, analyzing the role of logistics in the plan, felt that the effects of Moltke's alteration to avoid invading Dutch neutrality were more apparent than real, since two corps of troops which had been allocated to contain the 90,000-strong Dutch Army could instead be used for the invasion of France. Further, van Creveld points out that while Schlieffen had assigned five corps for the investment of Antwerp Antwerp (English: /ˈæntwɜrp/ ; Dutch: Antwerpen, [ˈɑntˌʋɛrpə(n)] ( listen); French: Anvers, [ɑ̃vɛʁ, ɑ̃vɛʁs]) is a city and municipality in Belgium and the capital of the Antwerp province in Flanders, one of Belgium's three regions. Antwerp's total population is 472,071 (as of 1 January 2008) and its total area is 204.51 km2 (78.96, Moltke made do with only two. "Though it is therefore quite true that Moltke's right wing was not as strong as Schlieffen had planned to make it, this loss was more than compensated for by the economies effected in [Moltke's] version of the plan."[3] Early in the war, according to the directives of Plan XVII, the French mobilized and hurled their forces towards the German border in an ill-fated attempt to recapture Alsace-Lorraine Alsace-Lorraine was a territory created by the German Empire in 1871 after the annexation of most of Alsace and the Moselle region of Lorraine in the Franco-Prussian War. The Alsatian part lay in the Rhine Valley on the west bank of the Rhine River and east of the Vosges Mountains. The Lorraine section was in the upper Moselle valley to the north. This played exactly into Schlieffen's conception of a trap through double envelopment, which called for a loose defense of the border, and actually for retreats by which the French forces would have been lured further away from the main thrust of the German advance. However, Moltke's weakening of the German right, the defense of Alsace-Lorraine, and the transfer of three army corps and one cavalry division from the western front to help contain the Russian advance into East Prussia, all contributed to the failure of the German army to break through the Allied In everyday English usage, allies are people, groups, or nations that have joined together in an association for mutual benefit or to achieve some common purpose, whether or not explicit agreement has been worked out between them. When the term is used in the context of war or armed struggle, such associations may also be called Allied Powers, forces at the Marne. Without that breakthrough, the plan was destroyed.
Activation, and subsequent failure
Though debate continues about the merits of the Schlieffen Plan and even on whether the Schlieffen Plan was ever truly executed, ultimately the German invasion failed for seven major reasons:
A British postcard reflecting Belgium's determination to retain sovereignty- Belgian resistance: Although the Belgian army was only a tenth the size of the German army, it still delayed the Germans for nearly a month, defending fortresses and cities. The Germans used their "Big Bertha" artillery to destroy Belgian forts in Liège, Namur Namur (Dutch: Namen , Nameur in Walloon, Namurcum in Latin) is a city and municipality in Wallonia, in southern Belgium. It is both the capital of the province of Namur and (since 1986) of Wallonia and Antwerp Antwerp (English: /ˈæntwɜrp/ ; Dutch: Antwerpen, [ˈɑntˌʋɛrpə(n)] ( listen); French: Anvers, [ɑ̃vɛʁ, ɑ̃vɛʁs]) is a city and municipality in Belgium and the capital of the Antwerp province in Flanders, one of Belgium's three regions. Antwerp's total population is 472,071 (as of 1 January 2008) and its total area is 204.51 km2 (78.96, but the Belgians still fought back, creating a constant threat on German supply lines in the North. In addition, the German attack on neutral Belgium and reports and propaganda about atrocities turned public opinion in many neutral countries against Germany and Kaiser Wilhelm. Still, despite stiff Belgian resistance, the timetable for the Schlieffen plan was going according to schedule before it was halted in France.
- The effectiveness of the British Expeditionary Force: The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was small, numbering only 75,000 at the start of the war. The French mobilized millions of recruits, and their goal was to use this number to defeat the Germans quickly in Alsace Alsace is the fourth-smallest of the 26 regions of France in land area (8,280 km²), and the smallest in metropolitan France. It is also the sixth-most densely populated region in France and third most densely populated region in metropolitan France, with ca. 220 inhabitants per km² (total population in 2006: 1,815,488; January 1, 2008 estimate: 1. To this end, the French commander-in-chief Joseph Joffre Joseph Jacques Césaire Joffre was a French Catalan general between 1914 and 1916 during the First World War. He is most known for regrouping the retreating allied armies to defeat the Germans at the strategically decisive First Battle of the Marne in 1914. His popularity led to his nickname Papa Joffre placed the small but highly trained BEF on the left flank, where he believed there would not be any fighting. Due to the rapid German advance through Belgium, the British were almost annihilated several times, but they managed to delay the Germans long enough for French and British reinforcements to arrive. While the BEF was forced into retreat throughout the month of August, it provided enough resistance against the German First Army under Alexander von Kluck to help induce the German general to break off the Plan. Instead, von Kluck turned south-east towards Compiègne Compiègne is a commune in the Oise department in northern France, showing his flank to the Garrison of Paris under Gallieni Joseph Simon Gallieni was a French soldier, most active as a military commander and administrator in the French colonies and finished his career during the First World War. He was made Marshal of France posthumously in 1921. Historians such as Georges Blond, Basil Liddell Hart, and Henri Isselin credit Gallieni with being the guiding intelligence, making possible the "Miracle of the Marne The Battle of the Marne was a First World War battle fought between the 5th and 12th of September 1914. It resulted in a Franco-British victory against the German Army under Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. The battle effectively ended the month-long German offensive that opened the war and reached the outskirts of Paris. The counter-".
- The speed of Russian mobilization: The Russians moved faster than expected, gaining ground in Eastern Prussia more quickly than the Germans had planned for, surprising them. While the Russian advance may not have posed much real threat at the time, had they kept gaining ground at that pace, they would get dangerously close to Berlin. This caused the Germans to pull even more men from their main force, in order to reinforce the Eastern Front. This proved counterproductive, since the forces pulled from the Western Front were still in transit during the German victory at Tannenberg in early September 1914, while the battles on the Western front were being lost for Germany.
- The French railway system: Because of the delays caused by the British and Belgians, the French had more time to transfer troops from the border to Alsace-Lorraine. The Germans greatly underestimated how well they would be able to do this, especially with the extra time they were granted by the slowing of the German forces. The French sent some of their troops by train, some through taxis, and marched the rest of them. By the time the Germans got into France, the French were there waiting for them.
- Logistical shortcomings: van Creveld asserts that:
He concludes that, overall, the logistical shortcomings of the Plan did not contribute to the German defeat on the Marne. However,...Schlieffen does not appear to have devoted much attention to logistics when he evolved his great Plan. He well understood the difficulties likely to be encountered, but made no systematic effort to solve them. Had he done so, he might well have reached the conclusion that the operation was impracticable. ... Moltke did much to improve the logistic side of the Plan. Under his direction, the problem was seriously studied for the first time and officers trained in the 'technics' of warfare ... He did, it is true, make a number of changes in the Plan. From an exclusively logistic point of view, some of these were beneficial, but most were harmful. Nevertheless, taking his period of office as a whole, he probably did more to improve the Plan than to damage its prospects.[3]
In van Creveld's view the design of the Plan was not characterized by the kind of thoroughness and detailed planning that is usually thought to be the hallmark of the German General Staff, but by "an ostrich-like refusal on Schlieffen's part to face even those problems which, after forty years of peace, could be foreseen." Although Moltke did improve the Plan somewhat in this respect, it was not methodical advanced planning which enabled the German advance to succeed, but "furious improvisation"Had the battle gone in Germany's favour ... there is every reason to believe that the advance would have petered out. The prime factors would have been the inability of the railheads to keep up with the advance, the lack of fodder, and sheer exhaustion. In this sense, but no other, it is true to say that the Schlieffen Plan was logistically impracticable.[3]
That the Army achieved as much as it did, at a time when the standing orders could only be said to have caused no actual harm, is remarkable indeed. Critics of the advance would do well to keep this in mind.[3]
- Moltke's changes to the plan: Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke made several changes to the Schlieffen Plan, initially reinforcing the east with 180,000 men from the right-wing armies, weakening the invasion force in favor of defense. Moltke also had ideological opposition for the proposed passage of the invading armies through the neutral Netherlands, the subsequent shift delayed his armies in Belgium and resulted in the "race to the sea" after the Marne. Moltke also further reinforced his left-wing with Corps from the right to prevent Allied forces from penetrating too far into Germany itself, an issue Schlieffen was not concerned with (Schlieffen's plan called for the invading French forces to be enveloped, putting the political concern of hostile invasions behind the strategic opportunity to destroy the invading armies). This proved problematic, because the German units who were supposed to fall back and lure the French away from Paris and the German right flank, were now driving the French before them. Rather than diverting the French forces from the action, this placed the French units much closer to the German 1st and 2nd armies threatening Paris. Moltke also chose to send 80,000 more men to the east to assist with the Russian invasion against the advisement of General Ludendorff (two days before the reinforcements arrived the Germans had destroyed the Russians at Tannenberg). Ultimately Moltke reassigned 250,000 men (an entire army's worth) from the right-wing assault before finally abandoning the Schlieffen Plan. Repulsed by the left wing of Moltke's forces near Sarrebourg, the French retreated to the hills around the city of Nancy. Rather than sweeping around them and enveloping the French armies and Paris itself from the east, Moltke opted to directly attack their reinforced positions around Nancy which ended in an unmitigated failure.
- German underestimation of the British-Belgian alliance: Britain and Belgium had an alliance due to the London Treaty of 1839. Germany believed that Britain, which was wary of making alliances due to its wish to remain neutral, would not honour the treaty and would not rush to the aid of Belgium. The British, however, greatly amazed Germany by keeping with the terms of the treaty. The famous line "The Britons will go to war for a mere scrap of paper?" comes from the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg asking the British Ambassador Goschen about the decision.[4]
The failures in the West resulted in defeat at the First Battle of the Marne in September 1914, a stalemate, trench warfare, and a two-front war for Germany.
What eventually occurred was a "reverse Schlieffen", in that Russia was defeated prior to the Western Allies. The Russian army, aided by the Romanian and Serbian armies and considered by the German command as more dangerous than the Western Allies, was defeated with relative ease. Meanwhile the Western Allies had a larger manpower base from which to feed the war of attrition taking place. Even though Germany sent many divisions to fight in Italy and the Franco-Benelux theater following the collapse of Russia and the Eastern Front in 1917/18, the Western Allies still defeated the Central Powers' forces. In the 1918 summer campaign Italy obtained a long sought decisive victory over Austria-Hungary, and Austria withdrew from the war exposing Germany's southern flank. The defeat of Bulgaria also exposed Germany (and Austria) to an Allied advance up the Danube. Finally the entrance of the United States on the side of the Allies in 1917, and the arrival of substantial US troops, coupled with the failure of the final German offensives in the West in early 1918, allowed the Allies to push the Germans out of France and into Belgium, towards the German border. Once the long-held static positions were lost, Germany accepted the Allies' armistice terms.
Criticism
Several historians argue that the plan was unfeasible for its time, due to the recent advances in weaponry and the improved transportation of industrial warfare. Some would say the plan was "too good". B.H. Liddell Hart, for instance, praised the Schlieffen Plan as a conception of Napoleonic boldness, but concluded that:
- The plan would again become possible in the next generation—when air power could paralyze the defending side’s attempt to switch its forces, while the development of mechanized forces greatly accelerated the speed of encircling moves, and extended their range. But Schlieffen’s plan had a very poor chance of success at the time it was conceived.
In addition, some historians, including David Fromkin, author of Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?, and David Stevenson, author of Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy, have recently made arguments that what is known as the Schlieffen Plan may not have been an actual plan as such, but instead was laid down in one 1905 hypothetical memorandum and a brief 1906 addition.[5]
Schlieffen may not have intended his concept to be carried out in the form he laid down, instead, seeing it as perhaps an intellectual exercise. Fromkin has argued that, given what historians have recently seen in Schlieffen's papers, captured by the US Army along with other German war documents, that the memorandum had never been refined into an operational program. No orders or operational details (such as specific units for each area of the offensive) were appended. Furthermore, Fromkin says that the memorandum acknowledges the fact that for the plan to work the Germany Army needs more divisions, and there needs to be more parallel roads through Belgium. Fromkin continues by putting much of the genesis of the plan, as finally enacted, on Moltke, who had seen the memorandum and believed it to be a fully-operational plan which he then proceeded to expand upon. Fromkin, in fact, has advocated referring to the "Moltke Plan" as opposed to the "Schlieffen Plan", as it may have been more a product of Moltke's misreading of the Schlieffen Memorandum of 1905 and its 1906 codicil.
According to the historian A. Palmer, however, closer inspection of documents regarding the German war plan reveal that Moltke's changes were not that great, and that the plan was basically flawed from the start. He claims that the Schlieffen plan does not deserve its high reputation, because it underestimated pretty much everyone—the Russians, French, British, and Belgians. However, this would tend to support the view of Professor Fromkin, in that a poor plan would indicate its origin as one not fully vetted.
The British military historian John Keegan in summarizing the debate over the plan, criticizes it for its lack of realism about the speed with which the right wing of the German army would be able to wheel through Belgium and the Netherlands in order to arrive outside of Paris on schedule. He observes that, regardless of the path taken, there were simply not enough roads for the masses of troops planned to reach Paris in the time required. In other words, the Plan required German forces to arrive on schedule and in sufficient force, but in reality only one or the other could be achieved, not both.
Keegan also points to the Schlieffen Plan as a leading example of the separation between military war planning and political/diplomatic considerations which was one of the original causes of the war. Schlieffen conceived his Plan as the best possible solution to a strategic problem, while ignoring the political reality that violating Belgian neutrality was the thing most likely to invite British intervention and expand the conflict.
A factor in evaluating the significance of the Schlieffen plan is the misinformation that was widely disseminated during and after the war. Records were lost and material made up to paint the events in a light more acceptable to those making the decisions at the time.[6]
Another view is that both Palmer and Fromkin are correct. The Schlieffen plan could have been simply a document that spurred operational thinking and planning, and became the working name for a strategy of bypassing the bulk of the French forces through a flanking maneuver.
Additional facts
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- Schlieffen's solution reversed that of his great predecessor, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, whose experiences in the Franco-Prussian War with modern warfare and concerns regarding the increasing lethality of weaponry, made him doubt that a swift success could be achieved.[citation needed] Moltke had accordingly favoured limited operations against France and a major effort against Russia. Schlieffen, on the other hand, would seek an immediate all-out victory.
- The absence of General Helmuth von Moltke the Younger from the Western Front was a crucial (though not decisive) factor in the failure of the Schlieffen Plan. Communication was especially poor and, in addition, German forces sent wireless messages uncoded, allowing French forces under the command of General Joseph Joffre to pinpoint the location of the German advance.
- Further, Moltke balked at the weakness of the Alsatian "hinge" region, fearing that the massive strength of the right wing's hammer would allow the French to break through the relatively sparsely-manned left-wing "anvil". This had been part of Schlieffen's design as well—he had been willing to sacrifice some German territory in the short run to decisively destroy the French Army. Moltke refused to run the same risk and shifted some divisions from the right flank to the left flank in Alsace-Lorraine.
- The rigidity of the Schlieffen Plan has also been a source of much criticism. The plan called for the defeat of France in precisely 42 days. Armed with an inflexible timetable, argue many scholars, the German General Staff was unable to improvise as the "fog" of war became more apparent. Thus, many scholars believe that the Schlieffen Plan was anti-Clausewitzian in concept. On the other hand, General von Kluck made the decision at the front to wheel south-easterly instead of continuing on past Paris; German generals were taught to think for themselves, and in fact his decision to wheel inwards made orthodox military sense. However, it deprived Germany of the chance to force a decisive envelopment battle around Paris.
- German troops were exhausted by the time they engaged French forces; many horses (towing artillery pieces) died, having eaten green corn.
- German supply lines stretched 80 miles (130 km) at the Marne; the front line of the German Army had already broken into retreat before the rear had even arrived.
- After Germany's defeat at the Marne, there began a series of flanking maneuvres by both the Germans, and the British and French Allies heading northwards in one last attempt to end the war quickly. However, by December, the two armies had built an elaborate series of trench fortifications stretching essentially from the English Channel to the Swiss border which would remain nearly static for four years. Schlieffen's great gamble would, ironically, result in the one outcome he had feared: A long, drawn-out war of attrition against a numerically stronger enemy.
- Before the Schlieffen plan was implemented, Britain was officially neutral - despite already being in the Triple Entente with Russia and France. But since it had signed the Treaty of London 1839 (in which the neutrality and territorial integrity of Belgium were guaranteed by the era's major powers, obliging them to enter the war in opposition to the first violator), Britain was "forced" to engage in the fight against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.
Observation
Robert Leckie observed that justice was finally done in the Dreyfus affair in 1906 "as the defenders of Dreyfus had intended. What was not intended was that the French Army Intelligence should have been so discredited that it was placed in civilian hands, with the result that when Germany attacked in August, 1914, the French Army not only 'knew not the day and nor the hour' but actually reacted exactly as the Schlieffen Plan envisioned."[7]
See also
- Manstein Plan (Second World War plan with some similarities)
References
Notes
- ^ Grenville, J.A.S., A History of the World in the 20th Century, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 21
- ^ Rosinski, Herbert, The German Army, London, Hogarth, 1939
- ^ a b c d van Creveld, Martin, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. pages 121, 138-140. ISBN 0-521-29793-1
- ^ http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25_1/8.htm
- ^ Fromkin, David (2004). "Chapter 4: Countries Arm". Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 34–35. ISBN 0-375-72575-X. Stevenson, David (2004). "Chapter 2: The Failure of the War of Movement, Summer-Winter 1914". Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy. New York: Basic Books. pp. 38–39. ISBN 0-465-08184-3.
- ^ Fromkin, David (2004). "Chapter 43: Shredding the Evidence". Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 251–253. ISBN 0-375-72575-X.
- ^ Leckie, Robert (1968). The Wars of America. Castle Books.
Bibliography
- Foley, Robert Alfred von Schlieffen's Military Writings. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
- Foley, Robert T. "The Real Schlieffen Plan", War in History, Vol. 13, Issue 1. (2006), pp. 91–115.
- Fromkin, David, Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? New York: Vintage Books, 2004. ISBN 0375-72575-X
- Hull, Isabel V. Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany. Cornell University Press, 2005. ISBN 0801442583
- Landa, Manuel de. War in the Age of Intelligent Machines. 1991.
- Mombauer, Annika, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Ritter, Gerhard The Schlieffen plan, Critique of a Myth, foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart. London: O. Wolff, 1958.
- Rothenberg, Gunther E. "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment." in Makers of Modern Strategy Peter Paret (Ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Stevenson, David Catacylsm: The First World War as Political Tragedy. New York: Basic Books, 2004. ISBN 0-465-08174-3
- Stoneman, Mark R. “Wilhelm Groener, Officering, and the Schlieffen Plan.” PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2006. abstract
- van Creveld, Martin, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-521-29793-1
- Zuber, Terence, Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-19-925016-2
Categories: Conflicts in 1914 | Military operations involving Germany | Military strategy | Military theory
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Q. hey i desperately need help !!! please i need help trying to answer this question i need to do it in an essay way so any help website links Information ... anything will be greatly appreciated thank you x
Asked by wooooo - Tue Oct 21 14:07:58 2008 - - 3 Answers - 0 Comments
A. The adoption of the Schlieffen plan by Germany at the outbreak of the Great War ensured Britain's entry because of the guarantee given to Belgium to protect its neutrality. The plan directed the invasion of France using the neutral country of Belgium as a stepping stone and thereby avoiding the strong defencive string of forts creating a defence in depth all along the eastern boundary between France and Germany. The invasion through Belgium triggered mobilisation in Britain and the deployment of the BEF to France and Belgium and thus Britain's entry into WW1
Answered by Steve D - Tue Oct 21 14:35:45 2008